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Two Forms of Realism
Making Sense of Rorty’s Controversy with Brandom and Ramberg over
Objectivity
Yvonne Huetter-Almerigi
AUTHOR'S NOTE
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1 Brandom’s volume Rorty and His Critics (2000) is famous due to, as Jeffrey Stout puts it,
“the most startling passage in Rorty and His Critics and one as surprising as any in the
entirety of Rorty’s published writings” (Stout 2007: 16). In this passage, Rorty agrees
with Ramberg that the use of “getting things right,” which Ramberg promotes based on
Davidson, is fully compatible with his own approach, and declares the intention to use
it in the future (Rorty 2000c).1 In the same volume, incomprehensibly for many, Rorty
remains adamant about his refusal of Brandom’s request to use his notion of “made
true  by  facts”  (Rorty  2000a).  Philosophers  sympathetic  to  the  New  Pragmatists’
approach read the passages as an admission of Rorty’s eventual failure to avoid truth
and  realism.  Like  Stout,  they  “do  not  see  how  to  square”  (Stout  2002:  52)  Rorty’s
agreement  with  Ramberg  while  he  continues  to  resist  Brandom.  As  Stout  puts  it,
“Ramberg and Brandom appear to be explicating the same pre-philosophical ideal of
‘getting things right’ in the somewhat different philosophical idioms of Davidson and
Sellars, neither of which strikes me as inherently tainted by metaphysics” (2002: 52).2
Others, like William Curtis, hold that “Stout and others read far too much in Rorty’s
‘Response to Ramberg’ […] [T]here is ample evidence in Rorty’s earlier writings […] that
suggests that he always held this ‘reformed’ position urged by Ramberg” (2015: 73).
2 In what follows, I will, for the first time, contrast both positions because I think there is
a substantive difference between Rorty pre- and post-“Response to Ramberg” and there
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is  a  substantive difference between Ramberg’s  and Brandom’s request.  When Curtis
claims  that  Rorty  “always held”  the  “position  urged  by  Ramberg”  (2015:  73),  he  is
addressing the critics of Rorty who falsely regard him to be a linguistic idealist and
social constructivist. Indeed, Rorty never negated causal constraint, nor did he deny
that the world is mostly independent from our thoughts.3 Yet, the point of Ramberg’s
piece  (2000)  is  not  to  convince  Rorty  of  “the  brute  resistance  of  the  world,” as
Westbrook put it (2010: 14), but to convince him of the inescapability of the normative
and, hence, of the distinctiveness of the intentional vocabulary. After his conversation
with Ramberg, Rorty holds that there are non-causal word-world relations where he
formerly held that there are only causal relations. As Curtis rightly points out, he never
held that there are no relations. 
3 Before the debate, Rorty held versions of his Quine- and Davidson-inspired meaning
holism,  which  translated  his  Sellars-inspired  epistemological  behaviorism  into
semantics. In epistemology, Rorty took from Sellars that “assertions are justified by
society rather than by the character of the inner representations they express” and
that  “epistemic  authority”  is  explained  “by  reference  to  what  society  lets  us  say”
(Rorty 1979: 174). In semantics, Rorty, interpreting Davidson, thought that “The point
of  constructing a  ‘theory of  truth of  English’  is  not  to  […]  explain the relationship
between words and the world, but simply to lay out perspicuously the relation between
parts of  social  practice (the use of certain sentences) and other parts (use of other
sentences)” (Rorty 1979: 261-2). Though the world causally constrains what we can say,
it has no normative role in our linguistic practices. In his answer to Ramberg, Rorty, re-
interpreting  Davidson,  conceded  normative  lines  –  “certain  word-world  relations
which are neither causal nor representational” – running between world and speakers
(Rorty 2000c: 374). This revision is as substantive as it can be, a revision that Rorty –
this has to be said very clearly – did not follow up on after the debate. But this does not
diminish the importance of the concession and the difference it makes for how we can
appropriate and build on Rorty today.
4 Now,  I  turn  to  the  difference  between  Brandom  and  Ramberg  and  to  why,  in  my
opinion,  Rorty  agreed  to  use  Ramberg’s  notion  of  “getting  things  right”  but  not
Brandom’s notion of “made true by facts.”
 
1. Apparent Congruities
5 Besides being a contribution to the discussion of Davidson, Ramberg showed Rorty that
his antiauthoritarian stance can be advocated more powerfully when constructed in
the way Ramberg proposes. Ramberg makes two points: Firstly, he shows Rorty that
there  is  a  non-dangerous  way  of  making  use  of  a  difference  that  Rorty  formerly
rejected – namely, the difference between the intentional and physical vocabulary, or
the specialness of the “vocabulary of agency,” as Ramberg calls it. Secondly, there is a
non-dangerous way of using the notion “getting things right” and Rorty would do well
to use it. The reason why Rorty accepts both parts is that the key to the first part – the
difference between intentional and physical vocabularies – lies not in the irreducibility
of the intentional to the physical and not in some sort of gap between body and mind,
but  in  the  inescapability  of  norms.  Rorty  writes:  “agency  […]  only  appears  if  a
normative  vocabulary  is  already  being  used”  (2000c:  372),  which  is  a  variation  on
Ramberg’s: “descriptions emerge as descriptions of any sort at all only against a taken
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for granted background of purposive – and hence normatively describable – behavior
on the part of the communicators involved” (Ramberg 2000: 362).
6 The second part, the introducing of what seems a form of realism, is congruent with
Rorty’s program, he says, because it links the theory of truth intrinsically to the theory
of action: “Getting things right” means making them better suited to our purposes.
Therefore,  Rorty,  from there  on,  should use  or  at  least  should not  have objections
against  the  notion  “getting  things  right”:  “There  are  certain  word-world  relations
which are neither causal nor representational – for instance the relation ‘true of’ which
holds  between  ‘snow  is  white’  and  snow,  and  the  relation  ‘refers  to’  which  holds
between ‘snow’ and snow” (Rorty 2000c: 374). 
7 Rorty arrives at these proclamations because, following Ramberg’s considerations, he
revises his understanding of Davidson’s concept of triangulation: “It was a mistake to
locate the norms at one corner of the triangle – where my peers are – rather than
seeing them as […] hovering over the whole process of triangulation. […] It is not that
my peers have more to do with my obligation to say that snow is white than the snow
does,  or  than  I  do”  (Rorty  2000c:  376).  Similarly,  Rorty  writes  in  his  response  to
Davidson in the same volume that: 
The point of this doctrine [triangulation] is  that you cannot get along with just
holistic inferential relations between beliefs and statements (as coherence theorists
tried to do) nor with atomic relations of  being-caused-by (as realists  fixated on
perception still try to do). You have to play back and forth between causation and
inference in a way which does not permit any of the corners of a triangle to be
independent of any of the others. (Rorty 2000b: 78)
8 Is this not exactly what Brandom tried to do with his notion “made true by facts”?
Brandom explicitly tried to show how “facts” enter the inferential game. The world
cannot justify a claim, since justification is an inferential affair, but the world can make
claims correct in the sense of true: “The representational model,  after all,  does not
purport to tell us about justification (at least, not directly); its claim is that the use of
our empirical vocabularies stands in normative semantic relations to the world, in that
how things are determines the correctness of our claims in the sense of their truth”
(Brandom 2000: 161). He continues, “I think one can understand facts as true claims,
acknowledge that claiming is not intelligible apart from vocabularies, and still insist
that  there  were  true  claims,  and  hence  facts,  before  there  were  vocabularies”
(Brandom 2000: 162). Brandom, in a second step, shows also how “facts” in his account
enter the justificatory process: 
In fact, the same strategy applied above to domesticate epistemic correctness as
truth  can  be  extended  to  domesticate  epistemic  correctness  as  justification  or
warrant. We can see the facts as standing in normative relations of justification to
our claiming as well as in causal relations of triggering them. Indeed, we can see
them as standing in the normative relations precisely because and insofar as they
stand in the causal relations. (Brandom 2000: 165)
9 Given the last  citation of  Rorty  above –  on how you have to  “play  back and forth
between causation and inference” – Brandom’s account seems indeed very similar, if
not  interchangeable  with  how  Rorty  depicts  Davidson’s  triangulation  after  reading
Ramberg. Against this background, it is perfectly reasonable to ask why Rorty agrees
with Ramberg but not with Brandom.
10 I do think the playing “back and forth” indicates a kind of problem since in order to
“play back and forth” you need two realms between which to perform the maneuver.
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My claim is that in the way Ramberg proposes Davidson’s “triangulation,” there are not
two strictly distinct realms and, therefore, also no gaps to bridge by “playing back and
forth.” This, I will show, is the reason why Rorty embraces Ramberg’s version but not
Brandom’s, which implies two distinct realms. 
 
2. Differences
11 Brandom’s two realms appear as he differentiates between the act of claiming and what
is claimed, or, more importantly, of what is claimable: “I want to say that facts are true
claims in the sense of what is claimed (indeed, of what is claimable), rather than in the
sense of  true claimings” (Brandom 2000:  162).  “With this  distinction on board,”  he
continues, “there is nothing wrong with saying that facts make claims true – for they
make claimings true. This sense of ‘makes’ should not be puzzling: it  is inferential”
(Brandom 2000: 162). This means, as Brandom explains in Making It Explicit, they have
no  explanatory  but  only  expressive use.  True  claims  are  “providing  an  expressive
equivalent” of  a  “fact” (Brandom 1994:  328).  For Brandom, “‘It  is  true that snow is
white’ is a semantic expression of a nonsemantic fact” (1994: 329). He makes overt use of
the  representational  scheme  which  operates  with  two  distinct  realms,  yet  the
representational power aspirations are domesticated because they are plausible only
with  reference  to  a  vocabulary  using  these  notions.  One  might  say  that  authority
remains solely at the angle of one’s peers, to use Rorty’s Davidsonian picture.
12 Yet, Brandom strengthens the non-vocabulary part by granting that: “There were no
true claimings before there were vocabularies, because there were no claimings at all.
But it does not follow that there were no true claimables” (2000: 162). He explains why:
“For facts are true claims in the sense of what is claimed, not in the sense of claimings.
If we had never existed, there would not have been any true claimings, but there would
have been facts (truths) going unexpressed, and in our situation, in which there are
claimings, we can say a fair bit about what they would have been” (Brandom 2000: 163).
13 Brandom’s strategy is that whereas only social practices install authority, we do confer
it in our representational language practice to the angle with the world insofar as the
representational  model,  as  cited  above,  purports  “that  the  use  of  our  empirical
vocabularies stands in normative semantic relations to the world, in that how things
are determines the correctness of our claims in the sense of their truth” (Brandom
2000: 161). Since we ourselves transferred authority, for Brandom no harm is done. But
Rorty is not convinced:
Why am I so intent on resisting Brandom’s attempt to reconcile the fact that facts
are  intelligible  only  relative  to  vocabularies  with  un-Davidsonian  notions  like
“making-true” and “correspondence”? Because I think that nobody would have had
a use for this  cluster of  notions unless they had a conception of beliefs  cutting
reality at joints which are not relative to vocabularies – which are Nature’s Own,
owing nothing to the human needs and interests which led us to dream up photon-
talk and baseball-talk.  Without this  cutting-at-the-joints  imagery,  nobody would
ever  have  suggested  that  true  beliefs  were  accurate  representations  of  reality.
(Rorty 2000a: 185)
14 Brandom  thinks  his  approach  is  immune  to  this  critique  because  “there  is  in  this
picture no contact between naked, unconceptualized reality and someone’s application
of concepts” (Brandom 2000: 165). I think Brandom is right that in his picture there is
no direct contact, but there is naked, unconceptualized reality! 
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15 Martin Kusch makes a similar critique of Brandom’s account. Kusch points out that for
Brandom, “concepts are always perspectival in so far as their contents are different for
different individuals (different individuals have different inferential articulations for
the  same concepts)”  (Kusch 2002:  255).  But  then Brandom goes  on to  suggest  that
“objects are ‘non-perspectival in a strong sense’” (Brandom 1994: 594, qtd. in Kusch
2002: 255). This is where objectivity comes in; what is shared by all perspectives is that
there  is  a  difference  between  what  is  objectively  correct  in  the  way  of  concept
application and what is merely taken to be so, and objectivity lies in the perspectival
form of our practice of attributing and endorsing beliefs and commitments. But Kusch
says:  “Contrary  to  what  Brandom alleges,  he  has  not  shown that  objects  are  ‘non-
perspectival in a strong sense.’  What he has shown is that the attributer of a de re
belief-attitude does not treat the object as perspectival” (Kusch 2002: 258). “But this
only shows,” Kusch points out, “that de re attributers neglect the perspectival character
of their beliefs about the object; it does not show that the beliefs and the objects are not
perspectival. Of course they are perspectival” (2002: 258).
16 Kusch insists on perspectivity because this strengthens his own version of relativism.
The point for me here is not to decide whether objects are non-perspectival in a strong
sense4 but to underline that Brandom takes them to be, as can be seen from his appeal
to the already cited ancestral scenarios where there are truths “going unexpressed”
(Brandom 2000: 163), and that the correctness of claims is determined by “how things
are” (Brandom 2000: 161).
17 There are two points in particular in this account that are troubling from the point of
view that I am attributing to Rorty-in-accordance-with-Ramberg. The first is exactly
the part that Brandom thinks is his salvation and to which Rorty, apart from his answer
to Ramberg, also could have subscribed: namely, the no-direct-contact-but-only-causal-
pressure part. I return to this below. The second point, one that troubled Rorty also
before Ramberg’s paper, is that there is a place for naked reality in Brandom’s picture.
“Unconceptualized  reality”  in  Brandom’s  sense  is  not  just  a  move  in  our  current
representational language game. It bears deeper, metaphysical implications; It is not
just a notion in that it has ontological aspirations.
18 This can be seen from Brandom’s concept of the “claimable.” Brandom’s system would
be  complete  and  work  beautifully  without  the  “claimable.”  The  “claimable”  adds
nothing if not the flavor of the strong, unconceptualized, unchangeable part of reality –
reality without us. This is something that Brandom’s system could not offer otherwise
because  Brandom  starts  from  actual  “claimings”  and,  as  the  system  is  inferential,
authority lies only with the interlocutors and not at the angle of the world. This is so
even if, as mentioned above, when we use the representational vocabulary, we transfer
authority to the angle of the world. At this point, the transfer is simply a move inside
the representational language game. Brandom, at this juncture, is right: “making true”
works inferentially (Brandom 2000: 162). The problems arrive with the “claimable.” If
the “claimable” were only a derivative, reified, abstract version of actual claimings,
then there would be no problem; the “claimable” would be a (rather useless) accessory,
but surely not a concept that licenses talk about truths “going unexpressed” (Brandom
2000: 163) in ancestral time and facts beyond vocabularies. However, this is exactly the
license  Brandom wants.  The function of  the  “claimable”  is  precisely  to  delimit  the
space for potential claims, and this space is enclosed by non-linguistic being (the ontos
on).
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19 Brandom’s hidden ontological and metaphysical background assumptions can also be
seen in his appeal to common sense and realist intuitions in the following example: 
That old semanticist and modal logician Abraham Lincoln was asked “If we agreed
to call the tail a ‘leg,’ how many legs would horses have?” His answer was: “Four,
because you can’t change how many legs horses have by changing the way we use
words.”  This  is  surely  the  right  response.  One  cannot  change the  nonlinguistic
facts,  in  the  unloaded sense,  by  changing  linguistic  ones.  In  the  counterfactual
situation envisaged,  the words “Horses have five legs,”  would be true,  but  only
because it would not say that horses have five legs, and so would not conflict with
the fact that horses would still have four legs. (Brandom 2000: 163)
20 The question this raises is  how far Brandom’s “nonlinguistic  facts” are “unloaded.”
They are unloaded in the sense that the material outer-world does not offer norms for
how to talk about it; this is why Rorty, beyond his response to Ramberg, thinks that
Brandom’s  “heart  is  certainly  in the right  place” (Rorty 1998:  135).  Yet,  Brandom’s
nonlinguistic facts are not unloaded when it comes to the stability and independence of
unconceptualized reality, to objects being “non-perspectival in a strong sense.”
21 Objectivity  in  Brandom  is  in  the  structure,  in  the  perspectival  form  itself,  not  in
content. That said, the “is-seems”-difference, which is built into our representational
discursive practice, hangs on the idea that there is a way the world is, in a stable way,
though we will  never get  a  non-perspectival  look at  it.  This  “the way the world is
beyond our descriptions” seems, at first sight, to be merely structuring the form of our
discursive practice and not open to the charge of essentialism. Yet it is bound up with
ontological commitments since what ultimately makes claims true is their reliability to
the facts – where facts are not notions in a language game – though we do not have
measures for checking the actual fit.
22 A further point is that not only the representational frame presumes that there is a way
the world is, but Brandom himself does too. As Brandom writes: “We ought to have
little  sympathy  with  an  author  who,  upon  being  accused  of  commitment  to  some
objectionable thesis-idealism, let us say, or realism, or pragmatism, depending on one’s
sympathies – responds with outrage ‘But I explicitly say on page 193 that I am not an
idealist (realist,  etc.)!’  For that hardly settles that he is not also committed to it  by
other things in the book” (Brandom 1997: 197). In Making It Explicit as in Brandom’s
contemporary  papers,  there  are  points  (see  above)  where  he  is committed  to  two
realms that need to be bridged, between which to “play back and forth.” This includes
not only the causal vs. the normative realm but also language vs. the world. As a result,
his approach is open to the accusation that it  is  a very elaborate and sophisticated
version of the old scheme-content distinction5 because, in the end, though causation
and inference have to be played back and forth a number of times, what makes “facts”
facts is  that they supersede vocabularies even if  they are understandable only with
reference  to  vocabularies.  Therefore,  in  Brandom’s  approach,  vocabularies  are  still
played off against the world beyond vocabularies.
23 For  Brandom  it  is  important  that  there  are facts  prior  to  and  beyond  language.
Ramberg’s Davidson has no use for facts or the world without us. Ramberg offers Rorty
the possibility to skip tedious questions of ontology once and for all because his version
of  objectivity,  though  having  an  “is-seems”  distinction,  operates  neither  with  the
semantic register of “how the world is” nor with ontological commitments to how the
world is (in itself beyond us) because vocabularies and world are not played off against
one another. 
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24 Davidson, according to Ramberg, is not making a point about how antecedently and
independently of us existing facts enter, figure in, or determine the inferential game,
like Brandom does. But he is making a point about how communication is possible –
how communication is a way of acting – and how rationality is brought into being via
communication. In Ramberg’s version there is no difference between claimables and
actual claimings like there is in Brandom. No difference exists between what can be
potentially  claimed  and  what  is  actually  being  claimed  because  there  are  not  two
distinct realms that have to be put in connection. In Davidson “the contrast between
truth and error – true belief and false belief […] can emerge only in the context of
interpretation,  which  alone  forces  us  to  the  idea  of  an  objective,  public  truth”
(Davidson 1984: 170).
25 At first sight, this seems to be Brandom’s point as well. For Brandom the “is-seems”
distinction is part of our discursive practice. Yet, for Brandom what finally allows for
the distinction are facts beyond vocabularies, whereas what allows for the distinction
in Ramberg are successful interactions. In Davidson, and Ramberg,
[T]he objectivity which thought and language demand depends on the mutual and
simultaneous responses of two or more creatures to common distal stimuli and to
one  another’s  responses.  This  three-way  relation  among  two  speakers  and  a
common world I call “triangulation.” (Davidson 2001a: xv)
26 The  key  here  lies  in  the  words  “mutual  and  simultaneous.”  This  is  subtly  but
importantly  different  from how Rorty  describes  triangulation in  his  response  cited
above, as “playing back and forth between causation and inference.”6 “Playing back and
forth”  is  what  Brandom  does. In  Ramberg’s  Davidson,  you  never  get  one  angle  in
isolation in the way that Brandom appears to allow. Brandom first cuts the angles with
me and my peers to get naked reality in his ancestral scenarios of unexpressed truths.
Then the angle  with reality  gradually  enters  the inferential  realm via  the complex
causal-inferential  interactions  described  above.  In  Ramberg’s  Davidson,  you  always
have all three corners together. This is the difference between the Davidson of “radical
interpretation” where, “coherence yields correspondence” (Davidson 2001b: 307) – a
“correspondence without confrontation” (Davidson 2001b: 137) – which is nearer to
Brandom’s picture, and the Davidson of “triangulation” (see Ramberg 2001). On the way
Ramberg  proposes  Davidson’s  “triangulation”  to  Rorty,  there  are  no  time-slices
available in which one single individual finds herself contemplating the world in front
of (and divided from) her because the individual’s thoughts and language are always
already  bound  up  with  the  world  and  her  peers.  The  three  corners  of  Davidson’s
triangle are,  always and in every moment,  “mutual and simultaneous”;  they are an
undividable package because with one angle missing there is no rationality. For Rorty,
this is also the reason why Davidson uses “rationality, normativity, intentionality, and
agency as if they were roughly co-extensive predicates” (Rorty 2000c: 371). 
27 To  put  it  still  another  way,  for  Davidson  there  aren’t  even  angles,  but  only  an
undividable package of relations – relations which you cannot un-do and which bond
the intentions and purposes of agents always and in every moment together with their
common environment. Also for Ramberg’s Davidson, just like for Brandom, there was a
world before human beings came to exist.  But,  in sharp difference to Brandom for
whom there are truths “going unexpressed,” it had no meaning and no truth because
“meaning” and “truth” require all three angles. Now, with us in the picture, just like in
Brandom, we can make claims about ancestral time, but there is no way to curtail us
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and our present  purposes,  which triggers  the question about  that  time in the first
place.
28 Truth in Ramberg’s sense of “getting things right” is a success-maker. It  marks the
successful  interaction of  all  three angles,7 where language is  neither understood as
medium of explanation nor a medium of expression. Language is action; it directs and
manipulates our (inter)relations. This is what convinced Rorty: the theory of truth is
intrinsically connected with the theory of action. According to Rorty, Ramberg lets us
see that “an account of truth is automatically an account of agency, and conversely. He
helps us see that Davidson, like Dewey, is trying to break down the distinction between
the knowing, theorizing, spectatorial  mind and the responsible participant in social
practices” (Rorty 2000c: 371), which are practices in and interacting with the world.
29 This is where, according to Ramberg, Rorty’s concept of “redescription” comes in. It is
not some sort of idealism or social constructivism, but “bringing salience to different
causal patterns in the world, patterns with which we engage. And that is just the great
ability  that  our  language  brings,  this  ability  to  reprogram  our  causal  dispositions
through salience-alteration” (Ramberg 2000: 363). We can highlight certain features or
let  them  fade  into  the  background.  This  process  of  highlighting  and  rearranging
attention  alters  what  reality  consists  in:  “By  changing  our  causal  dispositions,
redistributing significance across kinds, we affect how we engage with the world, and
thus also the world. Indeed, if changing descriptive strategies […] didn’t have a causal
impact on how things are, it would be hard to see how language could have evolved as a
useful tool” (Ramberg 2000: 363). Ramberg’s appropriateness conditions do not refer to
the object only. The description does not have to fit the object – the description, to “get
things right,” has to fit the triangle. This is the important part and the difference with
respect  to  Brandom.  The  “right”  in  “getting  things  right”  marks  successful
interactions, not correct words in the sense of words opposed to a world beyond words,
as  is  ultimately  the  case  in  Brandom’s  account  of  “facts,”  though,  obviously,  in
Brandom, we have no methods to check the fit.
30 What does that mean for the horse and its legs? In Brandom, the horse will “always”
have four legs because it has four legs. The non-perspectival form of the horse, the
horse without us,  is a “fact,” where “facts” are established by language-games. Yet,
what ultimately accounts for objectivity is the difference between our perspectives and
the non-perspectivalness of the world beyond us. Our claims are correct if  they get
reality right (reality without us), although we are in Brandom’s “sanitized version,” as
he calls it, never directly in touch with it. 
31 Brandom’s version is, in my opinion, both too weak and too strong for Rorty at the time
of his concession to Ramberg. Brandom’s version is too weak because there is no direct
touch, and authority lies only at the angles with me and the peers. However, we can
decide to put authority on the other angle; this is what Brandom recommends we do or
what we are already doing in our representational language practice. Until this point it
is – Brandom is right – “sanitized,” as long as we agree that we are doing language-
games. Yet, and this is where Brandom’s approach is too strong, I agree with Kusch that
there is “naked reality” in Brandom – the object is “non-perspectival in a strong sense,”
although – this is the weak part again – there is “no bird’s-eye view above the fray of
competing claims from which those that deserve to prevail can be identified, nor from
which even necessary and sufficient conditions for such deserts can be formulated”
(Brandom 1994: 601). These claims seem difficult to hold together. 
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32 In Ramberg and Rorty, contact with the world is trivial. We always already are in touch.
We cannot not be in touch. But there is no “how things really are.” This does not mean
that we can make just any claim. We have to “get things right” and this entails that I,
my  fellows,  and  the  horse  are  a  package  in  the  process  of  description  and  re-
description. Authority is distributed. This is in Rorty’s already cited passage: “It was a
mistake to locate the norms at one corner of the triangle – where my peers are – rather
than seeing them as […] hovering over the whole process of triangulation […] It is not
that my peers have more to do with my obligation to say that snow is white than the
snow does, or than I do” (Rorty 2000c: 376).  This entails what Rorty himself calls a
“partial reconciliation of pragmatism and realism” (2000c: 374). Also in Ramberg, there
is no “birds-eye view” from which to decide between competing claims, but you can
provide success rates. These success rates are not based on the accuracy of the object-
description fit – objectivity is not guaranteed by the difference between our practice of
concept application and “how things are.” Claims are not “made true by facts,” but
they  are  based  on  the  triangle.  Claims  do  not  have  to  “get  things  right” beyond
vocabularies since if we “get things right” we cope successfully with our peers and the
world. In this scenario, “copying” is not ensuring successful coping. The weakness of
“copying” lies exactly in trying to get us out of the picture – in cutting an angle which
instead is needed. 
33 In  both  Brandom  and  Ramberg,  there  is  no  possibility  to  decide  once  and  for  all
between competing claims. In Brandom, this is due to the fact that we cannot rise
above our practice; hence we will never get a non-perspectival glimpse of the (only
theoretically potentially available) non-perspectival object. In Ramberg this is due to
the fact  that our practices can change,  and that with them, truth also will  change,
since, as noted, “getting things right” means taking account of the triangle and this
means thinking together our (changing) needs and purposes and our common world.
Further, the urge to decide between competing claims in addition to their rendering our
actions successful is a hangover from representationalism, which in Ramberg’s version
really  can  be  left  behind.  In  Ramberg there  just  is  no  split  between  ontology  and
semantics  or  epistemology;  or  put  differently,  Ramberg’s  approach  is  “post-
ontological” insofar as it skips questions regarding reality without us.
34 To apply this again to Brandom’s example with the horse’s legs, for Rorty at the time of
his response to Ramberg, calling the “tail” a “leg” will not get the horse a fifth leg! We
have to “get things right” in order to have success with our actions, and today calling
the “tail” a “leg” does not render our interactions with the horse and our peers more
successful. We cannot freely decide what “gets things right.” But we can change the
way in which we engage with the world through salience alteration. Therefore, there
actually are possible ways in which horses do not have four legs; this is when their legs
are no longer a salient feature because our practices have changed in a way that let the
horse’s legs fade into the background. In such a context, saying “the horse has four
legs” will let us fall out of success because the horse will not have four legs. This is not
just a change in linguistics, like, in Brandom’s example, the “counterfactual situation
envisaged, [where] the words ‘Horses have five legs,’ would be true, but only because it
would not say that horses have five legs, and so would not conflict with the fact that
horses would still have four legs” (Brandom 2000: 163). It is a change in our interaction
with matter, which we are and with which we also engage linguistically. 
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35 Brandom has to worry about how many legs there really are because he is not only
employing  or  describing  but  held  captive  by  the  representational  picture.  Once
referential  semantics  are  gone,  ontology  in  the  essentialist  sense  drops  out  as  a
corollary. This is what Ramberg showed Rorty. To be clear, the vocabulary-ontology
divide does not structure Ramberg’s approach. Ontology just is not at stake or in sight.
The  things  we  “get  right”  do  not  supersede  vocabularies  because  words  are  not
opposed to objects when it comes to what allows for the distinction between truth and
error. For Ramberg, Davidson’s “is-seems” distinction is post-ontological because the
notion “leg” is (just) a way to cope – it helps and directs our interactions, where we, our
peers and the world are one undividable package. The question what “leg” really means
or refers to or what there is beyond our vocabularies has fallen off the agenda.
 
3. Two Forms of Realist Intuitions
36 Let me now return to Stout’s problems with squaring Rorty’s dismissal  of  Brandom
while  he  embraces  Ramberg.  For  Stout,  as  I  cited  at  the  beginning,  “Ramberg  and
Brandom appear to be explicating the same pre-philosophical ideal of ‘getting things
right’ in the somewhat different philosophical idioms of Davidson and Sellars, neither
of which strikes me as inherently tainted by metaphysics” (Stout 2002: 52). I hope to
have shown that the “pre-philosophical ideal of ‘getting things right’” Ramberg and
Brandom each aspire to is quite different. 
37 For Brandom and Stout this pre-philosophical ideal points to representational realism –
in an “unloaded form”, as Brandom would say – yet he would have had to show how the
non-perspectivalness of the world beyond vocabularies does not occupy a crucial role
in the overall structure of his concept of objectivity. The world without us still figures
as  the ultimate  touchstone,  though  as  a  touchstone  we  will  never  touch  and  a
touchstone  that  we  do  not  directly  compare  our  words  with  –  this  we  do  in  our
inferential practices. Yet, these practices are functioning according to the overall form
that there is a difference between what we say and how the world really is. Brandom’s
is-seems-distinction hinges on there being a world beyond us; material reality is as it is.
To the potential question, “are objects non-perspectival in a strong sense or does the
total form of our inferential practices assume them to be?” Brandom’s answer most
probably would be “yes to both.” 
38 Brandom’s  version accommodates  representational  realist  intuitions  better,  and his
program is exactly this: to take the ecumenical instead of the revolutionary stance. For
Brandom, no harm is  done as  long as  we are  aware that  representationalism is  an
inferential  affair.  After  Making  It  Explicit was  published,  Rorty  wrote  some
recommendations  to  Brandom  on  how  to  face  the  likely  upcoming  accusations  of
relativism by advising him to be “more arrogant […] and to situate his philosophy of
language  within  an  immodest  metaphilosophical  framework  according  to  which
philosophical reflection can reject […] intuitions” (Rorty 1997: 177). One reason is that,
according to Rorty, inferentialism, even in Brandom’s causally constrained form, will
never be enough to convince people with strong realist intuitions, so he might as well
go with revolution. Another reason is that “rhetoric matters,” as Rorty puts it his essay
on Brandom in Truth  and  Progress  (Rorty  1998,  132).  This  is  the  Rambergian  point:
descriptions alter our dispositions, and by doing so they interact with the world – this
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is what the “language as tool” metaphor means. Brandom’s version does not actively
alter our dispositions, nor does it want to.
39 The pre-philosophical  intuition Ramberg starts from is  that we are able to interact
successfully  with our environment.  This  is  a  form of  realism that  does not  sharply
divide words and the world. Ramberg’s answer to the old pragmatist question, “Do we
need copying to cope?” is a clear “no.”
40 Ramberg provides  more  powerful  tools  for  two of  Rorty’s  interconnected  aims:  his
antiauthoritarianism and his openness to change. In Ramberg’s version, Rorty is right;
there  is  still  “no authority  called Reality  before  whom we need bow down” (Rorty
2000c: 376) because Ramberg “does not offer criticisms of or warrant for descriptive
strategies by appealing to the way the world is” (Ramberg 2000: 368). We can still toss
out  our  “old  intuitions”  and  are  not  slaves  to  essences  or  orders  of  being  while
simultaneously capturing what in representational language would be the pressure and
resistance of the outer-world, yet without representationalism and its alleged dualisms.
Put another way, in Ramberg’s version, there is no playing “back and forth.”
41 Pushing this line of thought further would also go in directions that, at first sight, do
not seem compatible with Rorty’s interests. Rorty’s Humanism is touched; in Ramberg’s
picture, we do not rely only on ourselves but on the world as well, though in ways that
do not  confer  the world authority  over  us,  nor  us  over  the world.  The question is
whether Humanism today is  still  serving the goal  that  Rorty wanted it  to  serve:  is
Humanism still the most suitable tool for our purposes? Does it still guarantee Rorty’s
antiauthoritarianism and change? In Ramberg’s version, the concept of “authority” is
freed from foundational  imagery and offers  therewith new ways of  conceptualizing
“authority”  in  which  “authority”  is  not  necessarily  connected  to  “hierarchy”  and
“domination.”  Ramberg’s  version  could  even offer  ways  to  toss  out  the  concept  of
“authority” altogether, and this would alter our dispositions a fair bit. Yet, these last
thoughts are very tentative and need much more elaboration. 
42 My  intention  here  was  only  to  insist  on  the  difference  between  Brandom’s  and
Ramberg’s  requests.  The  difference  between  their  respective  approaches  seems
minimal but, as I hope to have shown, this small difference has a large impact on how
we  understand  our  conceptual  agency  and  our  ways  to  engage  with  the  world.
Brandom’s ultimately dualist version confines agency to the inferential realm which
stands across from a world that is as it is in itself. Rorty, in his answer to the debate,
does not criticize Brandom for making the causal-normative distinction – a distinction
which Rorty,  until  his  answer to  Ramberg,  advocated himself.  This  rightly  inspired
scholars in the past to think Rorty’s approach could still be hampered by dichotomies
(e.g. Gascoigne 2008, Levine 2020, Tartaglia 2016) – dichotomies that apply to Brandom
as well. The difference between Rorty and Brandom in this regard is that in Rorty the
distinction – which, on my reading, he abandons in his answer to Ramberg – functioned
to argue for eliminativism, whereas in Brandom, ultimately, the distinction functions
to petrify the world. 
43 Ramberg’s version offers a whole new set of possibilities to understand reality and our
linguistic interactions because it does not play the world off against vocabularies. In
this account, the world, though equally material and independent from our thoughts, is
not a bloc that stands in front of us but is the environment in which we are enmeshed
and from which we cannot be divided. Depending on which features of this world we
highlight  –  which  become  “salient”  and  which  fade  in  the  background  –  reality
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changes. This has a material impact on our lives and is where the ethical and political
potency of this approach lies, which is precisely the reason why Rorty agreed to it.8
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NOTES
1. [EU EMBLEM] This article is part of a project that has received funding from the European
Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska Curie
grant agreement N°832636.
2. See also e.g. Gascoigne (2008: 213-21). For an account that points to the possibility of Rorty
having a point in resisting Brandom, see Levine (2008, 2010, 2020). Levine’s approach differs from
mine insofar  as  he  moves  his  support  of  Rorty’s  argumentation in  order  to  strengthen New
Pragmatism. Levine is pointing with Rorty to weak spots in New Pragmatism that, according to
Levine, should be corrected (2008: 189). My interest in this article is to spell out in detail the
difference between Brandom’s and Ramberg’s respective approaches in the debate. These details,
I believe, point to a possibility of ameliorating the concept of “realism.” However, that is beyond
the scope of this article.
3. See e.g. Rorty (1982: xxvi).
4. As I will argue below, having this question and wanting to answer to it, is part of the problem.
The question itself needs to be eliminated.
5. “Old” because what is played off against each other are language vs. empirical content. 
6. “Mutual and simultaneous” is congruent with Rorty’s description if one strongly emphasizes
the second part: “You have to play back and forth between causation and inference in a way
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which does not permit any of the corners of a triangle to be independent of any of the others” (Rorty
2000b, 78; emphasis added), though, I would insist, that “playing back and forth” is a metaphor
that creates confusion because it does presuppose two realms.
7. “Interaction,”  here,  does  not  mean “playing  back  and  forth.”  More  aptly  one  should  say
“action” instead of “inter-action,” where “action” always includes the mutual and simultaneous
dependence of all three angles in every moment and without the possibility to make cuts.
8. The first person who heard, read, and insisted I pursue this project was Richard Bernstein. So,
it is due to him that the project took its start. But it is due to Bjørn Ramberg, with his immense
knowledge,  wisdom,  and  mentoring  skills,  that  I  advanced  it  to  completion;  this  article  is
unthinkable  without  his  support.  Earlier  drafts  of  the  paper  received  sophisticated  and
perspicuous comments from Chris Voparil, Neil Gascoigne, and Michael Bacon. My thanks also go
to two anonymous reviewers for their valuable remarks. I presented earlier versions of the paper
during a masterclass with Bernstein in Munich; at the 3rd European Pragmatism Conference in
Helsinki;  and at  the  workshop “Truth versus  the  Rhetoric  of  Truth:  Authority,  Realism,  and
Power” in Oslo. I am most grateful to the audiences and commentators of these events. 
ABSTRACTS
There is a famous puzzle in Rorty scholarship: Did or did Rorty not subscribe to a form of realism
and truth when he made concessions regarding objectivity to Bjørn Ramberg in 2000? Relatedly,
why did Rorty agree with Ramberg but nevertheless insist upon disagreeing with Brandom,
though large parts of the research community hold their two respective requests for shifts in
Rorty’s stance to be congruous? The present article takes up the discussion and tries, for the first
time, to make sense of Rorty’s insistence that there is a difference between Brandom’s notion of
“made true by facts” and Ramberg’s notion of “getting things right” by showing that Ramberg’s
appropriateness-conditions are fully compatible with Rorty’s revised interpretation of Davidson’s
concept of “triangulation,” whereas Brandom’s inferential “made-true-by-facts”-language game
is  not.  The  reason  why  Rorty  agrees  with Ramberg  but  not  with  Brandom,  I  argue,  is  that
Brandom’s contemporary concept of objectivity, as developed in his contribution to the debate
and  in  his  Making  It  Explicit,  works  with  a  scheme-content  distinction,  whereas  Ramberg’s
Davidson-based version does not. As many of his critics suppose, Rorty’s concession to Ramberg
entails  a  substantive  revision of  Rorty’s  position,  not  just  a  clarification.  However,  this  new
position  is  not in  conflict  with  Rorty’s  most  important  commitment,  namely  his  anti-
authoritarianism. The revised account still does not bind him to the forms of realism and truth
that his critics favor. The article explains to which forms of realism and truth Rorty’s concessions
to Ramberg commit him instead.
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